



Forced Marriage as a Harm in Domestic and International Law 





This is a pre-publication version which appears in (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 57-88. The 







This  article  explores  the  disjuncture  between domestic  legal  and  political  responses  to 
forced marriage faced by nationals of Western states with the response of refugee law to 
forced  marriages  occurring  elsewhere.  The  framework  of  international  human  rights 
suggests that forced marriage should be a paradigm example of ‘persecution’, the central 
criterion for any refugee claim.  Yet our analysis of refugee decisions in Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom revealed a profound and on‐going reluctance to accept that forced 
marriage was, in and of itself, a persecutory harm. 
 
 
The issue of forced marriage emerged in Europe in the mid 1990s as a locus of considerable 
public and political concern. Attention focused on young women from first or second 
generation immigrant backgrounds forced or pressured to marry men from their parent’s 
country of origin. Although paternalistically framed, and arguably informed by racist tropes 
of cultural ‘tradition’, family ‘honour’ and immigration ‘convenience’ or fraud, some of these 
domestic initiatives were also motivated by feminist and migrant women’s groups and 
involved active and on‐going commitment to ensuring young women’s sexual and social 
agency. These domestic initiatives are starkly at odds with how forced marriage appears in 




The article opens with an examination of forced marriage in international human rights law, 
and examines how European states have adjusted domestic immigration, criminal and family 
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law provisions in recent years in response to a surge in public and political mobilisation.  We 
then turn to the centrepiece of our analysis, the case set of 120 refugee decisions involving a 
claim of forced marriage as persecution.  This case set includes all available decisions in 
English  over  the  past  fifteen  years  from  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada  and  Australia. 
(Because of marked differences in US asylum law, policy and procedure, our analysis of the 
available US cases is published separately.1) Our analysis considers how these cases address 
the key areas of refugee jurisprudence in forced marriage claims: persecution, nexus, 
credibility and membership in a particular social group. The final section of the paper is an 
examination of the work of Britain’s Forced Marriage Unit. The Forced Marriage Unit is a 
unique government entity, providing a range of assistance, including extraterritorial 
assistance, in response to individual requests for state protection in avoiding and escaping 
forced marriage. Yet, strikingly, British refugee jurisprudence has evinced a deep and on‐ 
going resistance to forced marriage claims in comparison with Canada and Australia, where 
forced marriage has not yet emerged as a major domestic policy issue. 
 
 
We conclude that forced marriage provides a key site for understanding and explaining the 
persistent failure of refugee law to fully embrace human rights norms, especially as they 
relate to gender and sexuality. This failure is caused by the structure of refugee law, which is 
erected on a foundation of ‘othering’ and is sustained by a recurrent division between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. This dichotomy means that refugee law endlessly replicates a division between 
the prosperous, benevolent, liberal and rights respecting West, and the impoverished and 
encultured others who threaten to overwhelm ‘us’ if the floodgates are not kept tightly 
closed. While we acknowledge that there are many valid criticisms to be made of 
international human rights discourse generally and domestic initiatives on forced marriage 
specifically, our analysis in this article reflects our belief that meaningful consent to marriage 
is nevertheless an issue of vital importance. We proceed from the premise that the state has 
a role, indeed a duty, in protecting consent to marriage that extends to responding to claims 





1 See C. Dauvergne and J. Millbank, ‘Forced Marriage and the Exoticisation of Gendered Harms in US Asylum 
Law’ (2010) 19 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, forthcoming. 
2  
The discussion in this article focuses mainly upon the context of refugee law, however we are aware that 
requests for state assistance in responding to forced marriage are far broader, and   include for example 
3  
 
FORCED MARRIAGE CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The choice of whether, and whom, to marry is so intimately connected to self determination 
that it has been acknowledged in several key international instruments as a fundamental 
human right. The requirement that marriage be undertaken only with the ’free and full 
consent’ of both parties was first enshrined in Article 16(2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and was soon after reiterated in several instruments which can 
directly bind states:  Article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) in 1966 and Article 1(1) of the Convention on Consent to Marriage in 1962.   The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 used the 
more limited language of ‘free consent’ in Article 10(1). In 1979 the Convention on the 
Elimination of  all  Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) addressed marriage 
rights in greater detail (including equality of status within marriage, rights over property and 
rights with regard to children) in recognition of the fact that historically marriage has been a 
key site of women’s inferior legal status and social subordination. CEDAW Article 16(1)(b) 
expanded the language of consent to include, ‘The same right freely to choose a spouse and 
to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent’. 
 
 
Given how marriage has been understood in human rights law, one would expect that the 
issue of forced marriage would find a direct fit in the framework of refugee law.  Our study 
of forced marriage instead demonstrates a stark disjuncture between refugee jurisprudence 
and human rights jurisprudence. At international law, a refugee is someone who: 
owing to a well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being  outside  the country  of  his  former habitual  residence as  a  result  of  such 







domestic violence protection orders, nullity of marriage applications, sexual assault complaints, wardship 
proceedings and claims for emergency housing. 
3 
Article 1(a)(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150, as amended by the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267. 
4  
On the basis of this definition, international refugee law provides ‘surrogate’ protection for 
individuals whose country of nationality cannot or will not protect them from certain types 
of harm.  It is clear in the jurisprudence that states will not be held to the standard of 
protecting their citizens from every breach of an international human rights standard: some 
breaches constitute being persecuted and others do not. While the protection offered by 
refugee law is not identical to that offered by international human right law, it should be 
related to, and intelligible through, international human rights standards.4 
 
 
In his influential 1991 book James Hathaway argued that, ‘persecution is most appropriately 
defined as the sustained or systematic failure of state protection in relation to one of the 
core entitlements which has been recognised by the international community’.5 In defining 
core entitlements Hathaway proposed a four tiered human rights approach to persecution, 
organising human rights statements according to the degree of obligation they place on 
states.  First and second tier rights are those enunciated in the UDHR and made binding by 
their inclusion in the ICCPR and the ICESCR.   The first tier comprises non‐derogable rights 
such  as  freedom  from  arbitrary  deprivation  of  life,  protection  from  torture  and  cruel 
inhuman  and  degrading  treatment, freedom from slavery, the right  to recognition  as a 
person in law and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The second tier comprises 
rights which  are derogable only in cases of national emergency, such as freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or detention and the rights to marriage, privacy and family life with which 
we are concerned here. Any breach of the first tier and discriminatory or non‐emergency 






See eg D. Anker, ‘Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 133; K. Daley and N. Kelly, ‘Particular Social Group: A Human Rights Based Approach in Canadian 
Jurisprudence’ (2000) 12 International Journal of Human Rights Law 148. 
 
5 
James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) 112. 
 
6  
ibid, 108‐110. The third tier rights are those found in the UDHR and contained within the ICESCR, which, 
unlike the ICCPR does not impose immediately enforceable standards upon states. Third tier values include the 
right to work, entitlement to food, clothing, housing, medical care and basic education, as well as protection of 
the family. Fourth tier entitlements are rights recognised in the UDHR but not elsewhere codified. They include 
the right to own property and the right to be protected from unemployment. While severe or discriminatory 
breaches of the third tier could in some circumstances be persecutory, breaches of the fourth tier would very 
rarely be so under any circumstance. 
5  
Hathaway, forced marriage should be clearly understood as persecutory harm.7  Moreover, 
forced marriage (in the context of abduction by soldiers during war) has recently been 
recognised in international humanitarian law as an ‘inhuman act’ independent of sexual 
assault and sexual slavery.8 
 
 
Forced marriage has been explicitly acknowledged as a gender‐related form of persecution 
in a number of national and international refugee law documents. The Canadian guidelines 
on gender related persecution, first released in 1993, include under their fourth category of 
claimants, ‘Women who fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for 
transgressing, certain gender‐discriminating religious or customary laws and practices in 
their country of origin’ adding as an example women who violate such norms by ‘choosing 
their  own  spouses’9,  and  in  a  later  section  include  ‘female‐specific  experiences’  of 
persecution such as forced marriage.10 Likewise the 1996 Australian gender guidelines note 
 
forced marriage as the third of four examples of ‘gender‐based treatment against women’ 
 
which  may constitute  persecution.11  Forced  marriage was included  in  the original  2000 
 
United Kingdom refugee tribunal gender guidelines under ‘gender specific forms of harm’.12 
 
Revised (and greatly truncated) UK gender guidelines that now only operate at bureaucratic 





Notably, the original 2000 UK Gender Guidelines expressly endorsed the Hathaway human rights approach, 
while the current guidelines do not do so: see n 12 below and n 13 below. 
 
8 
See Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu SCSL‐2004‐16‐A, Armed Forced Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
Appeals Chamber Decision (22 February 2008); Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao SCSL‐04‐15‐T RUF, 
(Revolutionary United Front) Trial Chamber judgment (25 February 2009). 
 
9  
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board, ‘Guideline 4, Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender‐Related 
Persecution’ (1996), s A I 4. 
 
10 
ibid, section B, ‘Considerations’. 
 
11  
Australia, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ‘Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision 
Makers’ (July 1996) 17. 
 
12 
Immigration Appellate Authority (UK), ‘Gender Asylum Guidelines’ (2000) at [1.13]; see also [2A.24] and a 
specific acknowledgement of the role of marriage in violating the human rights of lesbians and gay men at 
[2A.25]. These guidelines operated at Tribunal level, and drew heavily upon a model developed in 1998 by the 
NGO Refugee Women’s Legal Group. When the Tribunal was abolished and reconstituted in 2005 the new 
Tribunal determined that it was not bound by its predecessor’s guidelines: Asylum Aid, ‘Submission of Evidence 
to the Independent Asylum Commission’, 27 July 2007 at [40]. 
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marriage rights in assessing the objective likelihood of gender based harms.13  While the 
 
2002 UNHCR gender guidelines refer only in passing to forced marriage as a form of 
persecution,14  the 2008 UNHCR guidance note on sexual orientation identifies the issue as 
one of importance and deals with it in some detail.15 Yet these standards were rarely utilised 
in analysis of whether those forced to marry form a ‘particular social group’ under the 
Refugee Convention or whether forced marriage constitutes a form of persecution.16 
 
 






Beginning in the early 1990s, forced marriage emerged as a matter of public concern in a 
number of European countries, with a series of high profile individual cases widely reported 
in the media.17 In 1992, a feature story about a young Norwegian‐Pakistani girl abducted by 
her parents and forced to marry while on a family holiday and then rescued by Norwegian 
authorities, gained considerable public attention. A similar event in 1997, concerning an 18 
year old named ‘Nadia’ generated sustained political action in Norway, including a criminal 




UK Home Office, Asylum Policy Instructions, ‘Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim’ (2004, revised version 
2006), topic 3A(iii), 4 and topic 11, 13‐14. 
 
14  
UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection: Gender‐Related Persecution within the Context of Article 
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, HCR/GIP/02/01 
(2002) at [36], (viii): ‘Female claimants may also fail to relate questions that are about ‘torture’ to the types of 




UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (2008) 
especially at [13], see also [27] and [28]. 
 
16 
Both the UK and Australian guidelines have in general been honoured far more in the breach than the 
observance:  see  eg  S.  Ceneda  and  C.  Palmer,  “Lip  Service”  or  Implementation:  The  Home  Office  Gender 
Guidance and Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK, Asylum Aid Report (2006); S. Kneebone, ‘Women within the 
Refugee Construct: “Exclusionary Inclusion”' in Policy and Practice — The Australian Experience’ (2005) 17 
International Journal of Refugee Law 7. 
 
17 
The background to these developments is explored in more detail in: H. Siddiqui, ‘There is no “honor” in 
domestic violence, only shame!’ in L. Welchman and S. Hossain (eds), ‘Honour’: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence 
against Women (London: Zed Books, 2005) and A. Bredal, ‘Tackling Forced Marriage in the Nordic Countries: 
Between Women’s Rights and Immigration Control’, ibid. 
 
18 
Bredal, ibid, 323‐333. 
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was the 1998 murder of Rukshana Naz by her brother and mother.19 By the late 1990s, this 
attention led to shifts in law and policy in a number of jurisdictions, and developments have 
intensified in the 2000 decade.20  The policy trajectory has varied in different states but in 
each case, two themes have been constant: forced marriage is an undeniable ‘wrong’ to be 
eradicated by the protective, exclusionary or educative functions of the benevolent state, 
and   coercion  to   marry  from  family   and   community   members  arises   from  cultural 
‘otherness.’21  The twinning of these themes, combined with an implicit understanding of 
 
vulnerable brides as ‘ours’ and imposed grooms as ‘theirs’, generated an intense early focus 
on immigration restrictions as the ‘answer’ to the ‘problem’ of forced marriage.22 
 
 
Of all European countries, Denmark directed its reform energies most explicitly and 
continuously towards immigration restriction. Legal changes limiting family reunification 
immigration provisions began in Denmark in 1998 and were tightened again in 2000, 2002 
and 2004.23  These restrictions included raising the age limit for those being sponsored or 
sponsoring as a spouse to 24, a reverse onus of proof requiring couples to show their 
marriage is voluntarily contracted, requirements for independent housing and financial 
capacity, a bar on spousal reunification for cousins who are married and a requirement that 
both spouses have a stronger ‘affiliation’ with Denmark than with any other country.24 The 




19 Rukshana had been forced to marry a much older man chosen by her family but after several unhappy years 
and two children, she became involved with her childhood sweetheart and sought a divorce. She was seven 
months pregnant with her lover’s child when she was killed. 
 
20 
See eg UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on the Status of Women, Report of the Secretary‐ 
General, ‘Forced marriage of the girl child’ (December 2007). Sherene Razack argues that this intensification is 
a response to the racist anti‐Muslim political climate which crystallised in the West following 9/11: ‘Imperiled 
Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced 
Marriages’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 129, 129‐132. 
 
21 
See in particular Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Forced Marriages and Child Marriages’ 
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Document 10590 (June 2005): ‘The root causes of this 
practice lie chiefly in the tendency for traditions to become fossilised in migrant communities’: at [9] and 
Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1468 (October 2005) at [1] and [2]. 
 
22 
See in particular Razack, n 20 above. 
 
23 
Bredal, n 17 above, 342‐345. 
 
24 
Summarised in Bredal, ibid, 343‐344. 
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the basis that the greatest vulnerability was faced by young people with little independence 
from their families being coerced into marriages with overseas born (often older) spouses 
from the same ethnic background. It was not until most of these restrictive regulations were 
in place that Denmark produced an ‘Action Plan on Forced, Quasi‐Forced and Arranged 
Marriages’  with  proposals  that  included  objectives  such  as  counselling,  education  for 
teachers and case workers, residential facilities and a research program.25 
 
 
In contrast, Norway pursued an inverse trajectory, beginning in 1998 with an ‘Action Plan’ 
that did not focus on immigration restriction; indeed it suggested liberalising immigration 
policies might actually reduce incentives to forced marriage.26 The initial plan focused on 
education and support for victims.  Immigration law changes were not introduced in Norway 
until 2003, and were minimal in comparison with Denmark.27   In this same year, a specific 
criminal provision on forced marriage was introduced in Norway, a move replicated in 
Germany in 2005 and Belgium in 2007.28 During the same time period, France made several 
changes to procedural requirements to ensure genuine consent for marriage.29 
 
 
Whether the principal focus of government initiatives is immigration restriction or education 
and service provision for potential victims, these responses portray an ideological distinction 
between ‘marriage for us’ and ‘marriage for them’.  Forced marriage, in this dichotomous 
view, is embedded in foreign cultural practice, and in contrast makes the marriage of 




Denmark, ‘The Government’s Action Plan on Forced, Quasi‐Forced and Arranged Marriages’ (15 August 
2003), at http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/05ED3816‐8159‐4899‐9CBB‐ 
CDD2D7BF23AE/0/forced_marriages.pdf (last visited 21 May 2009). 
 
26 
Bredal, n 17 above, 333‐335. 
 
27 
The principal change is that since 2004 the minimum age for sponsored and sponsoring spouses was raised 
from 18 to 21 and more stringent requirements to demonstrate financial resources if either one of them is 
under 23 years old. Norway revised its ‘Action Plan’ in 2007 with a budget of 70 million kroner: H. Tajik, 
‘Workshop on Combating Forced Marriage: Experience from the UK and Norwary’ 4 September 2007 at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/aid/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/politisk‐radgiver‐hadia‐ 
tajik/2007/Workshop‐on‐Combating‐Forced‐Marriage‐Ex.html?id=481440 (last visited 13 July 2009). 
 
28  
B. Clark and C. Richard, ‘The Prevention and Prohibition of Forced Marriages ‐ a Comparative Approach’ 





law and policy – appear somehow ‘culture free’.  In addition, it obscures the role that the 
dislocations of migration, increasingly restrictive migration policy, and associated 
intergenerational disconnections, have played in creating a contemporary Westernised 
setting for forced marriage. 
 
 




The emphasis upon immigration restrictions by European nations to address forced marriage 
has been criticised as anti‐Muslim, intertwined with the war on terror, and punitive of 
immigrant women.30 In recent years some states have moved away from immigration law as 
the key ‘remedial’ site in forced marriage policy. The United Kingdom over the past decade 
provides an interesting example of the development of a multifaceted approach, strongly 
shaped   by   community   and   feminist   involvement.   While   initial   action   focused   on 
immigration, including raising the age requirements for spousal visas from 16 to 18 in 1999, 
it rapidly moved in a number of other directions. 
 
 
In 1999 the United Kingdom government convened a working group on forced marriage 
which in 2000 issued a report entitled ‘A Choice by Right’. This was influenced by the efforts 
of  individual  politicians,  especially  Margaret Moran, who  represented the  electorate of 
Luton South not far from London and Ann Cryer who represented Keighley from the north of 
England near York.31 The working group was set up by the Minister for Community Relations 
and chaired by Baroness Uddin and Lord Ahmed, both members of the House of Lords. The 
working group comprised seven other members, of whom six were representatives of 
community groups (and three of which were specifically women’s organisations).32 The 




See eg A. Phillips and M. Dustin, ‘UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and Exit’ (2004) 52 
Political Studies 531; Razack, n 20 above; A. Wilson, ‘The Forced Marriage Debate and the British State’ (2007) 
49 Race and Class 25, 36. 
 
31 
MP Moran has taken up the question of forced marriage as a centrepiece of her parliamentary role.  She has 
also supported research in her electorate, see for example, N. Khanum, ‘Forced marriage, family cohesion and 
community engagement: national learning through a case study of Luton’ (March 2008). MP Cryer 
commissioned a 2005 study focusing on the effects of cousin marriage in British Pakistani communities. 
 
32 
Working Group on Forced Marriage, A Choice by Right (2000), 28. 
10  
when it became clear that the working group was considering  mediation between potential 
victims of forced marriage and their families as an option. SBS strenuously opposed this  on 




In 2005, the Home Office in conjunction with the Scottish executive issued a consultation 
paper, ‘Forced Marriage: A Wrong not a Right’, which recommended introducing a specific 
criminal offence of forcing a marriage, as other European countries had done previously. 
Following more than 100 representations from community groups and other stakeholders 
opposed to criminalisation for a range of reasons, including the risk of preventing reporting 
by victims, this proposal was abandoned. Rather than criminalisation, the United Kingdom 
created a range of new civil remedies under the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act which 
passed in 2007 and came into effect in December 2008.34 The centrepiece of the Act is the 
‘forced marriage protection order’ designed to protect a person at risk of forced marriage, or 
 
who has already been forced to marry.35 ‘Force’ is defined to include threats or other 
psychological means, and a court may make a protection order on the application of the 
person in need of protection, a relevant (and statutorily defined) third party, any other 
person, or on its own initiative. The order can contain any prohibitions, restrictions, 
requirements or terms that are necessary to achieve its objectives, and it may have effect in 






Razack, n 20 above, 167. In fact the report was published with a guarded statement about mediation, and 
mediation was later rejected by the government as inappropriate: A Choice by Right ibid, 19. 
 
34  
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (UK). Scotland is currently considering whether to pass similar 
legislation: see Scottish Government, ‘Forced Marriage: A Civil Remedy? Consultation Paper’ (2008). Criminal 
charges under general law are still possible. In 2009 a three year gaol sentence was imposed by Manchester 
Crown Court on a mother who forced her 14 and 15 year old daughters to marry (the charges were inciting or 
causing a child to engage in sexual activity, arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence 
and intending to pervert the course of justice): P. Bainbridge, ‘Mother jailed over forced marriages’ Manchester 
Evening News, 20 May 2009; J. Narain, ‘Muslim mother who forced her school‐age daughters to marry their 
cousins is jailed for 3 years’ Daily Mail, 22 May 2009. 
 
35  
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (UK), s 63A. In the seven months to July 2009, 36 orders were 
reported to have been made: see D. Casciani, ‘Forced Marriage Plea to Schools’ BBC News 2 July 2009 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8129466.stm (last visited 13 July 2009). 
 
36 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (UK), s 63B. 
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ex parte and without notice.37  The order must be accompanied by an arrest power unless 
the court is convinced that in the circumstances this is not necessary to achieve the 
protection required.38  In short, the legislation creates a flexible tool, broadly modelled on 
earlier legislative approaches to domestic violence protection orders. The Act strenuously 
reinforces a pro‐active role for the courts in confronting and potentially averting forced 
marriage.39 A key aspect of the United Kingdom’s approach has been the establishment of 
the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  We discuss 
this initiative later in the paper.  At this point is it sufficient to note that the FMU has broad 




Southall Black Sisters were ultimately very influential on the model adopted by government 
and have been recognised for their role in developing the legislation.40 Their concerns 
regarding mediation and conciliation were taken squarely on board to the extent that the 
Statutory Guidance explicitly cautions that these practices, which are favoured in other child 
protection and family conflict contexts, are inappropriate in cases of forced marriage.41 The 







Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (UK), s 63D. 
 
38 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 (UK), s 63H. 
 
39 
Prior to the enactment of the legislation, English courts had been progressively extending the range of their 
jurisdiction concerning this issue. Re M Minors [2002] EWHC 852 wardship proceedings were brought on behalf 
of two girls aged 13 and 15 by a solicitor as their next friend, in conjunction with efforts to repatriate them 
from Pakistan where they had been taken by a relative and were ‘betrothed’. The Family Division of the High 
Court exercised both its inherent jurisdiction and statutory child welfare powers under the Children Act 1989 
(UK) and explicitly characterised ‘abduction and imposed marriage’ as child abuse at [24]. In Re SK [2004] 
EWHC 3202 concerned an adult who was in Bangladesh in circumstances where friends feared that she was 
being held against her will and likely to be forced to marry. The Foreign Office brought proceedings in England 
on behalf of the woman. The Court extended the inherent jurisdiction developed in relation to incapacitated 
adults and medical decision‐making to find that it held the jurisdiction to make orders and directions to locate 
the woman and to ascertain whether she was being held forcibly as well as to ascertain her ‘true wishes’. See 
also In the Matter of a Child [2008] EWCH 1436 (Fam) extending the wardship jurisdiction and assistance 
provisions under the Forced Marriage Act to a dual national who had never been to the UK. 
 
40
Wilson, n 30 above. 
 
41  
HM Government, The Right to Choose: Multi‐Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage 
(2008), 19. 
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understand the dangers of family counselling, mediation, arbitration and reconciliation42 and 
 
‘are aware that relatives, friends, community leaders and neighbours should not be used as 
interpreters or advocates – despite any assurances from this known person’.43 
 
 
While a significant advance on the immigration control and criminalisation focus of other 
European nations, the United Kingdom approach is not beyond critique.44 It is clear that the 
British state is operating here in a paternalistic mode. These initiatives are aimed at 
immigrant communities and much of the public discourse surrounding them is tinged with 
post‐colonial  cultural  imperialism.45    Although  the  FMU  repeatedly  states  that  forced 
marriage affects all religious groups, initiatives have frequently been received in the press as 
relating only to Muslim families in a way which maps onto the contemporary politics of 
terrorism and Islamaphobia (viz: misogynist/pre‐modern Muslim men mistreat ‘their’ 
women).46   While  feminist  groups  such  as  SBS  have  articulated  forced  marriage  as  a 
dimension of family or domestic violence, it has often been linked to ‘honour’ crime as an 
expression of (other) culture.47  Moreover, recently government attention has returned to 












See eg Phillips and Dustin n 30 above; Wilson n 3030 above; M. Enright, ‘Choice, Culture and the Politics of 
Belonging: The Emerging Law of Forced and Arranged Marriage’ (2009) 72 MLR 331; A. Gill and S. Anitha, ‘The 
Illusion of Protection? An Analysis of Forced Marriage Legislation and Policy in the UK’ (2009) 31 Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law, forthcoming; and A. Gill and S. Anitha ‘Coercion, Consent and the Forced 
Marriage Debate in the UK’ (2009) 17 Feminist Legal Studies, forthcoming. 
 
45 
For example, Wilson notes that when Lord Lester proposed the Civil Protection Bill he drew on the language 
of human rights but also placed the Bill explicitly in a (post) colonial context by referring to earlier efforts by the 
British colonial government in India to abolish Sati and child marriages, n 30 above, 35. The UK Employment 
Tribunal recently accepted that a stereotypical remark about forced marriage made in the workplace to a 
woman of Indian descent could constitute racial discrimination, violating the claimant’s dignity, see: Richmond 
Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] UKEAT 0458_08_1202 (employment Appeal Tribunal). 
 
46  
See eg Z. Sardar, ‘Forced marriages disgrace Islam’ New Statesman 28 March 2008. Although notably a 
recent high profile UK criminal prosecution was against a mother: n 34 above. 
 
47 
These need not be mutually exclusive: see eg the recent report of the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’‐Based Violence (2008) and Hackney Council, 
Domestic Violence and Hate Crimes Team, community information brochure, ‘Honour Crimes and  Forced 
Marriage’ (2007). 
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from 18 to 21.48 Additional measures, soon to be implemented, include a requirement that 
any person sponsoring a spouse must first register a declaration of intention to marry before 
departing the UK. This declaration will then be examined by a caseworker, assessed against a 
‘risk  profile’  for  forced  marriage  with  the  prospect  that  the  immigration  officer  may 
interview the sponsor for further information, refer them to support services, or even refuse 
the visa based on ‘vulnerability grounds’.49 
 
 
A  feminist  assessment  of  the  British  initiatives  is  complex.  While  it  is  evident  that 
government initiatives in this arena inescapably reflect a post‐colonial framework, we argue 
that the State does have a duty to act in response to claims for assistance from those facing 
forced marriage.  It is clear that many women, and some men, in the UK call upon the police 
and other government agencies for support in resisting coerced marriage. In this context, 
even flawed or problematic responses are, we believe, to be preferred over government 
indifference. Moreover, many UK government responses reflect a feminist and community‐ 
informed  understanding  that  forced  marriage  is  a  harm  that  is  based  upon  power 
imbalances  concerning  gender  and  sexuality  rather  than  simply  being  a  reflection  of 
‘culture’. The Forced Marriage Unit information brochure for lesbians and gay men states: 
 
A forced marriage is conducted without the consent of one or both people, and 
pressure  or  abuse  is  used.    This  could  include  both  physical  pressure  (when 
someone  threatens  to  or  actually  does  hurt  you)  or  emotional  pressure  (for 
example, when someone tries to make you feel that your sexuality brings shame on 
your family) to get married.50 
 
 
Given  the  pace  and  diversity  of  engagement  in  forced  marriage  issues  in  the  United 
Kingdom, we anticipated that decision makers would have an increasingly well informed 
understanding of forced marriage as a gendered human rights abuse.  Indeed in the 2002 





Home Office, UK Border Agency, ‘Annex A2 ‐ Guidance and Instruction on Forced Marriage’ (2009). For the 




Marriage Visas, ibid, at [5.1]‐[6.15]. In addition the paper sets out a ‘medium term goal’ of introducing a pre‐ 
entry English test for marriage applicants in order to promote ‘integration’. 
 
50 
FMU, ‘Guide to Forced Marriage for LGBT People’ (c 2007), 2. 
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marriage in terms of familial abuse and social exclusion, and urged government entities to 
assist by ‘offering effective exit’:51 
Courts and local and education authorities primarily, but also public authorities 
generally should recognise that their needs must be urgently and effectively met.52 
 
 
Yet we found the refugee cases, in particular those decided by English courts and tribunals, 
were utterly at odds with these domestic developments. This is not to suggest that refugee 
case law should or could respond in precisely the same way as the domestic legal framework 
does.  Rather, given refugee law’s role as surrogate or ‘back up’ human rights protection, we 
would hope to find refugee law taking forced marriage seriously, viewing it as a gendered 
practice,  and  analysing  it  in  ways  that  are  commensurate  with  human  rights  infused 
domestic initiatives. This was simply not so. 
 
 




The cases examined for this research comprise all the tribunal and court refugee 
determinations available in English from 1995 to 2008 (inclusive) in three countries where 




Re M Minors [2002] EWHC 852 at [25]‐[26]. 
 
52 
ibid at [26]. 
 
53 
Australian cases were all obtained from the Austlii case database (www.austlii.edu.au). UK cases were 
obtained from the Electronic Immigration Network case database (www.ein.org.uk), the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal website (www.ait.gov.uk), LEXIS and UN RefWorld databases. Canadian cases were 
obtained from the QuickLaw, Canlii (www.canlii.org) and LEXIS databases.  The search terms used were ‘forced 
marriage’ ‘forced to marry’ and ‘pressure to marry’. Cases cover the period from January 1995 to December 
2008. There were no New Zealand cases identified. In Australia and the UK the original decision on refugee 
status is taken by a delegate of the Minister, who is a bureaucratic officer. If this determination is negative, the 
applicant can apply for a de novo merits review of the decision. In Australia this review is undertaken by the 
Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which sits with a single member. In the UK until April 2005 this review was 
undertaken by the Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA) in a two tier system: first, an immigration adjudicator 
reviewed the decision de novo and then leave could be given to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) which 
until 2002 provided a second level of de novo review and after 2002 was limited to points of law by the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK). From 2005 the two‐tier structure was abolished and 
replaced by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT): Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) 
Act 2004 (UK). The AIT can only grant review based on an error of law. Canada is unique in that the Tribunal 
makes the first determination. Until 2002 this body was the Convention Refugee Determination Division which 
sat in two member panels, with a difference between the members resulting in a positive determination. Since 
2002 the new Refugee Protection Division (RPD) sits with only one member. There is no comparable release of 
low level US cases. Our analysis of the available US cases appears in another paper, see n 1 above. 
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of 69 decisions from Australia, 40 from Canada and a mere 11 from the UK.54  This set 
includes all judicial level decisions, but may represent as few as 5‐10 per cent of those made 
by the low level administrative tribunals because of limited release of such cases. While the 
small proportion of tribunal level cases raises the possibility that they could be 
unrepresentative of decisions at that level more generally, they nonetheless offer the best 
available data. Moreover, the fact that most of the trends we identified occurred at both 
tribunal and judicial level suggest that the available tribunal cases were not atypical overall. 
 
 
Given the prominence of UK domestic initiatives on forced marriage the very low number of 
UK cases is extraordinary, even taking into account the low release rate of tribunal decisions 
in that jurisdiction. It is impossible to understand the reasons for this with any certainty, but 
it is plausible that UK legislation which presumptively treats applications from a list of 
countries (known as the ‘white list’)55 as unfounded has had considerable impact in reducing 
the likelihood of forced marriage claims being adjudicated, especially at higher levels. 
Applicants from ‘white list’ countries with negative determinations are ‘certified’ so that a 
right of appeal from original bureaucratic level decisions is operative only from outside the 
UK. In addition ‘fast track’ adjudication at first instance has been particularly problematic in 
gender claims, and claimants from ‘safe’ or white list countries are far more likely to be 
subject to fast track processes.56  UK domestic initiatives concerning forced marriage have 
focused heavily, although not exclusively, on communities from Pakistan, Bangladesh and, to 
a lesser degree, India and Sri Lanka; yet none of these countries of origin appear in the ten 
available UK cases. While the original 2002 white list addressed EU accession countries, 
further countries were added in subsequent years: Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were added in 
2003 (although Bangladesh was removed again in April 2005 and Sri Lanka removed in 
 




Australian cases comprised 54 tribunal decisions and 15 Federal Court decisions, Canadian cases comprised 
13 tribunal decisions and 27 decisions of the Federal Court, UK cases comprised six tribunal decisions and five 
decisions of the Court of Appeal. 
 
55 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK), s 94. 
 
56  
See eg, Asylum Aid, ‘Submission of Evidence to the Independent Asylum Commission’ (July 2007); UNHCR 
London, Quality Initiative Project: Key Observations and Recommendations 2007‐2008 (2008). 
 
57 




Across the whole pool, the most common countries from which claims arose were 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Indonesia, Iran and Ghana, although only Bangladesh and Nigeria 
gave rise to more than 10 claims each.58 In fact the range of countries of origin was vast and 
unpredictable, coming from 39 separate countries, while claims from only 10 countries of 
origin – Bangladesh, China, Ghana, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Uganda and Turkey 




Women claimants outnumbered men exactly two to one. However gender alone gives an 
incomplete picture as sexuality was a very significant factor; women’s cases were largely 
heterosexual while men’s claims were almost exclusively gay. Of the 80 decisions involving 
women, 10 were lesbians while the remaining 70 were women identified as, or assumed by 
decision‐makers to be, heterosexual. Of the 40 decisions involving men, 38 were gay, while 
only 2 were heterosexual. Looking at the cases by sexual orientation thus reveals a 60 per 
cent heterosexual and 40 per cent homosexual divide.59 
 
 
Success and failure rates of claims, while drawn from what is only a partial case set, and 
based upon small numbers of claims, provide some important clues. The overall positive rate 
in decisions was 32 per cent.60 Within the umbrella of ‘forced marriage’ we identified distinct 
categories of claim: those where a marriage had actually taken place (‘actual forced 




21 claims were from Bangladesh, 12 from Nigeria, 6 from China, Ghana, India and Indonesia, 5 from Iran and 
Lebanon, 4 claims from Kenya and Zimbabwe; 3 claims from Egypt, Fiji, Nepal, the Philippines and Uganda; 2 
from  Ethiopia,  Guinea,  Jordan,  Mali,  Turkey  and  Zambia.  There  was  1  claim  from  each  of  the  following 
countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 




Of the total pool there were: heterosexual women 58 per cent, gay men 32 per cent, lesbians 8 per cent and 
heterosexual men 2 per cent. 
 
60 
The study counted ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ decisions from the perspective of the applicant, even if (as in the 
case of judicial review and also some UK Tribunal outcomes) the decision involves remittal and reconsideration 
of the claim rather than a substantive positive determination of refugee status. This gives an inflated sense of 
‘positive’ outcomes, as we do not have access to the majority of the remittal determinations and some, 
perhaps many, of these will ultimately be negative to the applicant. These figures also mask significant 
divergence across the receiving nations: with the positive rate 43 per cent in Canada and 26 per cent in 
Australia. In the UK of only 11 decisions, three were positive, but two of these were in fact remittals. 
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marriage’). Within ‘threatened marriage’ there was a further difference between claims 
which involved a specific threat of marriage to a particular individual and those which rested 
on a more general pressure or coercion to marry.61 
 
 
There were clear differences across these categories both in terms of the representation of 
heterosexual women versus gay men, and in comparative rates of success. Not surprisingly, 
‘actual forced marriage’ cases displayed a higher positive rate than ‘threatened marriage’ 
(44 per cent compared to 28 per cent). ‘Actual forced marriage’ claims comprised mostly 
heterosexual women.62  Among ‘threatened marriage’ specific threats of marriage also 
overwhelmingly  concerned  heterosexual  women63      whereas  claims  of  a  more  general 
pressure to marry were more likely to involve gay men.64  Marriage itself was usually the 
 
central feature of heterosexual women’s claims, whereas it was often a more minor or 
cumulative part of claims brought by gay men. The lesbian cases were exactly divided, with 
half of them featuring actual forced marriage or a specific threat such that forced marriage 
was central to the claim in a manner akin to the heterosexual women’s cases, while the 
other half were more similar to the gay men’s claims in that homophobically motivated 
persecution was the core element of a claim in which marriage was a general threat or more 
tangential aspect. Notably, gay men were markedly more successful than heterosexual 
women overall (40 per cent positive compared to 27 per cent), while lesbians fell in between 
the two (30 per cent positive).65 The reasons for these differences are explored below. 
 
 
Claimants must demonstrate that the risk they face is ‘for reasons of’ one of the articulated 
grounds  for  protection:  race,  religion,  nationality,  political  opinion  or  membership  in  a 
 
61   
Sixteen  decisions  concerned  an  actual  forced  marriage,  while  marriage  was  threatened  in  104  of  the 
decisions (comprising 63 where the threat was specific and 41 where the threat was general). 
 
62 
12 heterosexual women, 2 gay men and 2 lesbians. Six of the heterosexual women and one of the gay male 
claims in this category were positive, but neither of the lesbian claims succeeded. 
 
63 
48 of the 63 decisions were heterosexual women, with 10 gay men, 3 lesbians and 2 heterosexual men.  One 
heterosexual man and one lesbian in this group were successful. 
 
64 
Of 41 decisions on general pressure, gay men compromised 26, with 10 heterosexual women, and 5 lesbians. 
 
65 
Bearing in mind that there were only 10 lesbian cases, so even one additional positive or negative decision 
would tilt these figures significantly. Of the two claims made by heterosexual men one was negative and the 
other positive. 
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particular social group. In forced marriage cases, the nexus which is usually argued is to 
membership of a particular social group such as ‘gay men’, ‘lesbians’, ‘homosexuals’ or 
‘women’.  Both gender and sexual orientation claims are grounded in an individual’s non‐ 
conformity with prevailing social and religious codes concerning gender roles, sexual 
behaviour and accepted modes of family formation. UNHCR gender guidelines released in 
2002 acknowledge this common underpinning, noting that sexual orientation claims ‘contain 
 
a gender element’ because of refusal to ‘adhere to socially or culturally defined roles or 
expectations  of  behaviour  attributed  to  his  or  her  sex’.66   The  experience  of  direct 
persecution by state agents is rare in both gender and sexuality claims which much more 
commonly concern harm at the hands of non‐state actors, often of an on‐going rather than 
one‐off nature, and failure of effective state protection. All groups of applicants examined in 
this research struggled to articulate the harm of forced marriage and to establish a nexus 
between their convention ground and the harm feared. However the issue of identifying the 
social group was particularly difficult for heterosexual women, whereas for gay men and 
lesbians establishing the nexus between the group and the persecution, that is, that the 
harm feared was ‘for reasons of’ their group membership, posed the major barrier. A further 





Particular social group 
 
While Canada accepted gender‐based grounds for refugee claims, including forced marriage, 
from the mid‐1990s, gender was not widely accepted in Australian jurisprudence as the basis 
for a particular social group prior to the High Court decision in Khawar in 200067  and was 









n 14 above at [16]. 
 
67 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1. 
 
68 
R v IAT & Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Shah; Islam v IAT ('Shah and Islam') [1999] 2 
AC 629. 
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Many claims brought by heterosexual women in Australia in the 1990s failed because the 
decision‐maker was not prepared to accept that ‘women’69 or women ‘defying their parents’ 
marriage arrangements’ were capable of forming a social group. For example: 
It may be the case that there are many people who defy their parents regarding 
marriage arrangements, but this does not lead to them being recognisable as a 
particular social group, notwithstanding that they have in common their acts of 
defiance. In this case, the harm feared by the Applicant is a consequence of what she 
has done, not what she is.70 
 
In cases such as this one the failure to accept a social group led to rejection of a claim even 
though the threshold for a well‐founded fear of persecution had actually been met.71 These 
difficulties in establishing a social group definition go some way towards explaining the 
relative success of gay and lesbian claims when compared to those of heterosexual women 




In  the  UK  it  was  striking  that,  even  after  Shah,  cases through  the  early  to  mid  2000s 
continued to hold that there was no applicable social group for women fleeing forced 
marriage. On two occasions where first instance Adjudicators did find a social group in the 
course  of   making   a   positive   decision,   the   government  appealed   the   decision   and 
contradicted its own gender guidelines by specifically arguing that findings of a social group 
were an error of law.73  The sole UK case to contain a rights oriented analysis of forced 
 
69 
V96/04454 [1996] RRTA 1436 (6 June 1996) (China). 
 
70  
V94/01794 [1995] RRTA 403 (28 February 1995)(Turkey), 8. See also V96/04454 [1996] RRTA 1436 (6 June 
1996) (Indonesia); N97/15435 [1998] RRTA 429 (28 January 1998) (Ecuador); N97/14105 [1998] RRTA 2531 (12 
May 1998)(Nigeria); N98/25482 [1999] RRTA 1978 (16 November 1999) and  N95/09554 [1996] RRTA 340 (22 
February 1996)(Syria) where the applicant’s advisor did not put forward a Convention ground and the Tribunal 
held that there was not one. 
 
71 
See also the finding that the applicant could face harm from the government in China based upon her 
departure, but as her departure was not politically motivated this was unlikely and would not be relevant in 
any case as the applicant did not flee for a Convention reason, but on account of a claimed forced marriage’: 
V96/04454 [1996] RRTA 1436 (6 June 1996) (China), 10. 
 
72 
Heterosexual women had a positive rate of only 11 per cent in Australia prior to Khawar, n 67 above, and a 
38 per cent positive rate subsequently. 
 
73 
See YK (PSG‐Women) Turkey CG [2002] UKIAT 05491 (28 November 2002) in which the Tribunal granted an 
appeal, overturning the finding that ‘women in Turkey’ comprised a social group. See also RG (Ethiopia) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 339. See IAT Gender Guidelines n 12 above and 
UK Home Office Asylum Policy Instructions, n 13 above. 
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marriage arrived at the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in 2004 in part because of a failure at 
first  instance  to  find  that  women  in  Afghanistan,  or  some  subset  thereof,  could  be 
considered a social group.74  Yet such failures continued; in 2005 the Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal  held  that  fleeing  both  forced  marriage  and  female  genital  mutilation  (FGM) 
engaged neither the political nor religious grounds of the Convention and that ‘Nothing we 
have heard persuades [us] that the appellant can bring herself within a [social] group’.75 In 
that case the Tribunal appeared to consider that the forced marriage was entirely a familial 
dispute with no wider social relevance. 
 
 
The UK approach was in stark contrast to Canada, where no claim by a female applicant in 
our pool was rejected on the basis that she lacked a Convention ground. In the Canadian 
cases, the particular social group was framed variously as ‘women’,76 ‘women who refuse to 
follow traditional practices’77, ‘women subject to forced levirate marriage’78, ‘women being 
forced to marry against their wishes’79 and ‘women regarded as chattels’.80 On occasion no 
 
formulation of the social group at all appeared in the reasons for Canadian determinations.81 
 








NS (Afghanistan) CG [2004] UKAIT 00328. 
 
75 
See eg JM (Kenya) [2005] UKIAT 00050 (22 February 2005) at [35]. Note that in Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 
46 the House of Lords subsequently held unanimously that a young woman from Sierra Leone at risk of FGM 
was a member of a PSG (although there was disagreement as to breadth of the PSG: ‘women’ or ‘uninitiated’ 
women). Baroness Hale memorably began her speech by noting that, ‘The answer in each case is so blindingly 
obvious that it must be a mystery to some why either of them had to reach this House’ at [83]. 
 
76 




Re X [2002] CanLII 52705 (IRB) (9 September 2002)(Zimbabwe), 3. 
 
78 
Re X [2002] CanLII 52707 (IRB) (13 November 2002)(Nigeria). 
 
79 
Re X [2006] CanLII 61633 (IRB) (27 March 2006)(Zimbabwe). 
 
80 
This was the Tribunal’s own formulation: Re X [2000] CanLII 21420 (IRB) (10 January 2000)(Zambia), 3. 
 
81  




071426303 [2007] RRTA 132 (29 June 2007)(Saudi Arabia). 
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(‘women in Northern Albania who have failed to honour an arranged marriage’83) with no 
clear correlation between the specificity of the group and the rate of success. 
 
 
While the domestic refugee jurisprudence of all three countries has held that a particular 
social group cannot be solely defined by reference to the persecution (so for example, a 
group formulated as ‘women in Iran who are forced by their fathers to marry’ is 
unacceptable) it is clear from the forgoing discussion that Canada has taken a less strict 
approach to this issue than the UK or Australia.84 In 2005, after an exhaustive review of the 
case law on particular social group and gender, the UK Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted 
‘from experience that such cases often appear to became bogged down in pedantic, and 
often unnecessary, argument as to definition of the particular social group’.85  In that case 
the Tribunal took the unusual step of itself formulating the group (‘Young Iranian Women 
who refuse to enter into arranged marriages’), holding that this group was defined by its 
non‐conformity rather than the persecutory outcome which followed, and thus presented an 
acceptable basis for the particular social group.86 Thus resistance or opposition to the 
persecution (which is surely implicit in the making of the refugee claim) rather than the 
experience of  the persecution  is  centred as  the requisite  basis  of  group  membership.87 
Ironically, this represents a belated acceptance of the position first put by UNHCR in 1985,88 
 
and restated over and over since then in various gender guidelines, that the basis of many 








V0618399 [2006] RRTA 95 (22 June 2006)(Albania). 
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TB (Iran) [2005] UKIAT 00065 (9 March 2005) at [66]. 
 
86 
TB (Iran) [2005] UKIAT 00065 (9 March 2005) at [57]. 
 
87 
For an early critique of this position on the basis that it undermines the status based nature of the particular 





Session, No 39 (1985) cited in K. Musalo, ‘Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender 
Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence’ (2003) 52 DePaul Law Review 777. 
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In terms of the sluggishness of UK and Australian developments in gendered refugee 
jurisprudence, it is also interesting to note that even when the UK tribunal accepted in 2008 
that a woman opposing FGM and forced marriage was eligible based on ‘resistance to 
accepting  the  prevailing  cultural  norms  in  her  own  rural  society’,  it  did  so  largely  by 
reference to FGM with very little engagement with the issue of marriage; moreover it 
expressly denied that this kind of resistance could be characterised as political opinion or 
imputed political opinion.89  Australian decision‐makers have also repeatedly resisted any 
notion that forced marriage engages any other Convention ground apart from social group.90 
 
In contrast Canada decision‐makers frequently characterised forced marriage claims as 




Gay claimants did occasionally fail to be accepted as a social group, particularly if forced 
marriage was a significant part of their claim. For example in the 1998 Australian Federal 
Court  decision  of  MMM,  the  court  collapsed  gay  men  facing  pressure  to  marry  with 
‘bachelors’, making the social group both trivial and nebulous: 
 
These would, no doubt, include, for example, widowers, men keen to marry, 
misogynists, homosexuals, fathers and non‐fathers, rich men and poor, devout 
Muslims and others, handsome men and ugly, those already engaged to be married 
and those not.91 
 
 
While gay men and lesbians were more likely to be accepted as forming a particular social 
group than heterosexual women because their group was seen as more finite and also as 






FB (Sierra Leone) [2008] UKAIT 00090 ‘The appellant, of course, holds no political opinions. She does not 
approve of FGM or wish to participate in the Bondo or to marry an elderly man occupying a position of local 
chief. Her motives are not political in any discernible way’ at [72] (emphasis in original). In considering that the 
prospective groom was a major local political figure the Tribunal responded  that there was ‘but a peripheral 
connection between these political strands’  and ‘her obvious reluctance to marry a man for whom she does 
not care’ at [73]. 
 
90  
See eg N95/06944 [1996] RRTA 3480 (4 December 1996)(Bangladesh). One exception was in a case where 




MMM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 324 (Bangladesh) at [4]. 
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them to establish that persecution relating to forced marriage was therefore ‘for reasons of’ 
 








Marriage was often understood by decision‐makers as a ‘general’ or ‘universal’ expectation 
such that they frequently did not see any nexus between claims of forced marriage and 
sexual orientation, even when the marriage itself or conduct associated with it was accepted 
as persecutory.92 This also occurred, although to a far lesser extent, in claims made by 
heterosexual women where decision‐makers accepted a social group based on gender but 
characterised pressure to marry as ‘universal’ because it affected men also, or as entirely 
personal, social or ‘cultural’.93 It appears that the characterisation of claims under the 
particular social group membership ground rather than political or religious grounds may 
impede the ability to find a nexus because this reinforces the underlying notion that what is 
at stake is fundamentally a social or cultural matter.94 For example: 
there is a social pressure for both males and females to marry and that the extent 
of that pressure varies amount [sic] different social groups. The Tribunal 
acknowledges that the motivation to marry is based on cultural reasons rather than 
any Convention related motivation.95(emphasis added) 
 
 
In addition, many decision‐makers simply saw no connection at all between forced marriage 
and homosexuality. For example in a 1998 Australian case: 
The evidence is that all adult males in Bangladesh are subject to pressure to marry 
and form a family. The applicant’s claims about pressure to marry do not arise by 




See eg N02/44482 [2003] RRTA 1076 (10 November 2003); N99/28400 [2001] RRTA 846 (26 September 2001) 
at [10]; V97/06971 [1999] RRTA 260 (1 February 1999). 
 
93 
N98/22760 [2001] RRTA 532 (8 June 2001)(Lebanon). 
 
94  
See eg N02/44482 [2003] RRTA 1076 (10 November 2003) (Egypt). For an overview of nexus and gender 
related claims see Musalo, n 88 above. 
 
95  




N94/04854 [1998] RRTA 3506 (21 July 1998), 28. Repeated verbatim: N95/09552 [1998] RRTA 4153 (4 
September 1998), 19‐20. 
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In a 1999 case the Australian Tribunal added that while forced marriage ‘is regrettable and 
potentially a breach of human rights’ it is not ‘for reasons of membership of a particular 
social group of homosexuals in Pakistan’ because while it ‘certainly has the potential to 
adversely affect homosexual people… it also has the potential to affect other people who do 
not wish to marry at all, or who do not wish to marry at a particular time, or a particular 
person.’97 At times decision‐makers expressly held that pressure to marry would be ‘no more 




This ‘universalising’ impulse produced two results: an implicit exclusion of the prospect that 
the forced marriage of heterosexual women and men is also Convention persecution, and 
second a failure to acknowledge that gay men and lesbians are not similarly situated in 
relation to marriage in comparison with heterosexual people for the very reason that 
marriage is a heterosexual institution. Far from being a ‘social convention of general 




In Australia a long line of cases debated the question whether pressure to marry exerted a 
 
‘differential impact’ on gay men and lesbians. In the 1998 decision of MMM the Federal 
Court held that although the impact of forced marriage would be different (it may ‘fall 
harder’ on ‘an unwilling homosexual than an unwilling heterosexual’) the treatment itself 
was not ‘applied differentially’ and so was not ‘for reasons of’.100 While other decisions have 







V97/06971 [1999] RRTA 260 (1 February 1999)(Pakistan), 22‐23. 
 
98 
SZAOD v MIMIA [2004] FMCA 89 (19 March 2004)(Bangladesh) at [16] quoting the Tribunal. 
 
99 
ibid at [19]. 
 
100 
MMM v MIMIA (1998) 90 FCR 324 (Bangladesh). For critiques of the decision see: R. Germov and F. Motta, 
Refugee Law in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 327; J. Millbank, ‘The Role of Rights in 
Asylum Claims on the Basis of Sexual Orientation’ (2004) 4 Human Rights Law Review 193. 
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Court in 2005 which held that there was no ’singling out‘ of gay men in the context of 





A major gender difference, of significance in all of the receiving countries, was the role that 
forced marriage played. While marriage itself was almost always a significant, or critical, 
aspect of the claimed harm in women’s cases, it appeared rather as a catalyst for the harm 
feared in gay men’s cases. That is, in gay men’s claims, refusal to marry was commonly 
articulated  as  something  that  would  in  time  publically  indentify  the  applicants  as  gay 
because they lived in a cultural setting where marriage was regarded as compulsory and 
inevitable.102  Alternately, gay claimants on occasion argued that submitting to marriage 
would expose them as gay because wives would realise or suspect their sexuality.103  The 
 
inability of decision‐makers to view an unwanted heterosexual marriage as in and of itself 
harmful to a gay man is starkly highlighted by an early Australian case where the decision‐ 
maker actually suggested to the gay male applicant ‘living a secret gay life and perhaps even 
marrying’ as a means to ensure a future safe from persecution.104 While it is rare to see this 
view put so openly, it clearly forms the basis of assumptions about safety for gay and lesbian 
applicants in numerous other decisions where tribunals find that applicants can be ‘privately 




In women’s cases, marriage itself was often framed as the dominant basis of the claim. Yet, 
although an unwanted marriage constituted a significant part of the harm feared by women, 
and was often articulated as the main basis of the claim, it was infrequently received as 
 
101 
MIMA v SZANS (2005) 141 FCR 586 (Bangladesh) at [41]‐[42]. 
 
102  
This was sometimes accepted as grounding a well founded fear: see eg N98/21330 [1999] RRTA 1890 (20 
October 1999)(India); N04/49626 [2005] RRTA 6 (23 March 2005)(Bangladesh). 
 
103 
Such claims were rarely accepted. See eg: N99/28449 [2002] RRTA 1125 (17 December 2002)(Bangladesh); 
ignoring this risk was characterised as an error by the Magistrate in SZANS v MIMIA (2004) 186 FLR 158 but was 
overturned on appeal by the Full Federal Court as beyond jurisdiction in MIMA v SZANS (2005) 141 FCR 586. 
 
104 
N97/14489 [1998] RRTA 3545 (23 July 1998)(Nepal). 
 
105 
N98/23844 [2000] RRTA 842 (29 August 2000)(India). 
26 
 
such. Instead, decision‐makers addressed either the persecutory consequences of refusing to 
marry, or of leaving a forced marriage, for women, resulting in a complete absence of 
discussion of the persecutory nature of an imposed marriage itself.106  Indeed in a 2008 UK 
decision, issued after the new Forced Marriage Act was introduced to much public fanfare, 
the  Asylum  and  Immigration  Tribunal,  hearing  an  appeal  on  a  point  of  law  from  a 
government  adjudicator,  held  that,  ‘It  is  unnecessary  to  determine  whether  a  forced 
marriage is, in all cases, itself persecutory treatment.’107 
 
 
In both heterosexual and gay and lesbian claims, the harm feared was often construed as 
social,   familial   and   privately  motivated  when   family  members  were  the  agents  of 
persecution, with little or no consideration of the willingness or ability of the state to protect 
applicants from such harm.108  A notable example concerns a gay man beaten by several 
family members, where the Australian Tribunal responded: 
Such  tragic  family  rows  happen  all  the  time  anywhere, for  a  variety  of  reasons: 
someone does not want to marry a chosen partner; someone marries an “undesirable” 
person; someone brings scandal on the family through drunkenness or drug‐taking or 




The first two examples on this list would be regarded as paradigm examples of forced 
marriage harms under the UK’s domestic FMU approach.110 Yet here the decision‐maker 
implicitly characterises both being gay and refusing to conform to pressured or coerced 
marriages as ‘disappointing’ or ‘scandalous’ personal failings rather than as matters key to 







See eg N95/06944 [1996] RRTA 3480 (4 December 1996)(Bangladesh);   Brahmbhatt v MIMA [2000] FCA 
1686 (22 November 2000)(India). 
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FB (Sierra Leone) [2008] UKAIT 00090 at [54]. 
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See eg N97/15435 [1998] RRTA 429 (28 January 1998)(Ecuador) where harm from family is ‘personal’, 16 
and ‘individual’, 17. 
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N98/21362 [2002] RRTA 282 (28 March 2002)(India/Bangladesh), 7. 
 
110  
See eg FMU ‘Young People and Vulnerable Adults Facing Forced Marriage: Practical Guidance for Social 
Workers’ (2004), 2. 
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A second prevalent theme in the refugee cases, which also contrasted starkly with the 
domestic approach to forced marriage, was the focus on physical violence to the exclusion of 
consideration of emotional and environmental pressure, or to diffuse but threatening 
behaviours such as ostracism or deprivation of sources of economic support.111 Refugee 
decision‐makers  focused  quite  literally  upon  ‘force’  rather  than  related  questions  of 
coercion, duress or ability to meaningfully consent in the circumstances of the case. Yet 
domestic law in the receiving nations under discussion has dealt with the issue of non‐ 
consensual or forced marriage over many decades. Applications for nullity of marriage on 
the grounds of duress have considered in detail what ‘free consent’ to marriage means 
through examination of motivations and events leading up to and including the marriage 
itself. Broadly speaking, in determining whether the applicant’s will was ‘overborne’, there 
has been a clear move away from a narrow approach to duress requiring threats or acts of 
physical violence and fear of immediate danger,112  to instead take into account a wider 
range of psychological pressures, emotional threats, abuse and manipulation as well as the 
broader family and social context in which the engagement and marriage took place in order 
to determine whether there was genuine consent or only reluctant submission to the 
marriage.113  Such an approach is reflected in the materials of the FMU. Yet refugee cases 
rarely, if ever, engage with the idea of an applicant’s free will, and virtually all of them 
dismiss out of hand the idea that continued psychological pressure or threats from family 




Instead, in the refugee decisions, lack of social or legal power and the ability to consent — 
particularly for women applicants — appears to be represented through the blunt proxies of 
education, age, urbanity and ‘independence’ (itself represented by the proxies of income 




For an exception, see Re X [2002] CanLII 52705 (IRB) (9 September 2002)(Zimbabwe). 
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See eg Singh v Kaur (1981) 11 Fam Law 152; Parihar v Bhatti (1980) 17 RFL (2d) 289; Kecskemethy v Magyar 
(1961) 2 FLR 437. 
 
113 
See eg In the  Marriage of S [1980] FLC 90‐820; Hirani v Hirani [1983] 4 FLR 232; P v R [2003] 1 FLR 661; NS v 
MI [2007] 1 FLR 444; Re S [2007] 2 FLR 461; Mahmud v Mahmud [1994] SLT 599; Sohrab v Khan [2002] SCLR 
663. 
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(and/or their sisters) was subject to close scrutiny in assessing whether they were at risk of 
forced marriage, whereas the education level of men claiming forced or pressured marriage 
was rarely mentioned and was never relevant to the determination. 
 
 
Being ‘highly’ educated (usually taken to mean completion of secondary education), over the 
usual marriageable age for the country of origin, residing in an urban rather than a rural 
area, or exhibiting ‘independence’ through being employed or having travelled without 
parental supervision, were frequently taken to mean that female applicants did not ‘fit the 
profile’ for forced marriage. This was taken as proof that they were not ‘disempowered’ and 
were therefore able to refuse marriage (and were also capable of relocating away from any 
persecution or seeking state protection).114 So, for example in a 2001 Canadian case, country 
evidence that urban and highly educated women in Lebanon were ‘somewhat less 
constrained’ by social customs and faced ‘less severe consequences’ for non‐conformity 
than those who were less educated and lived in rural areas was re‐interpreted by the 
decision‐maker as ‘objective evidence’ that the claimant ‘would not be subject to forced 
marriage, and if she were, could evade it.’115 
 
 




While in general decisions from Canada were more sophisticated than the UK and Australia 
in their approach to all of the issues explored above, Canada was notable for some very 
 
114 
See eg the following negative cases: Re X [2001] CanLII 26821 (IRB) (6 February 2001) (Zimbabwe)(educated, 
urban); Re X [2006] CanLII 61633 (IRB) (27 March 2006) (Zimbabwe)(educated); Re X [2001] CanLII 26821 (IRB) 
(6 February 2001)(Lebanon) (urban); Afriyie v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] FCT 802 
(27 June 2003)(Ghana)(sophisticated, well‐educated, urban); Adams v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [2003] FCT 386 (1 April 2003)(Nigeria)(age, education, urban); N99/29824 [2001] RRTA 890 (16 
October      2001)(India)(well‐educated,      empowered);      V97/05699      [1997]      RRTA      2735      (21      July 
1997)(Iran)(education,  allowed  to travel); V97/06802  [1997] RRTA 3846  (30  September 1997)(China)(age); 
N02/44026 [2003] RRTA 521 (6 June 2003)(Lebanon)(educated, allowed to travel). See further first instance 
decisions referenced, but overturned, in the following judicial review decisions: Eimani v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] FC 42 (17 January 2005)(Uganda) referring to findings of the Tribunal that 
she ‘did not fit the profile of the typical victim of arranged marriage’ because she was urban, educated and 
travelled   at   [6];   Gill   v   Canada   (Minister   of   Citizenship   and   Immigration)   [2004]   FC   902   (23   June 
2004)(Zimbabwe) referring to earlier findings of Tribunal that it was not plausible the father would force 
marriage as the family was ‘educated and urban’ quoted at [9]; and  Vidhani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration) (TD) [1995] CanLII 3606 (FC) (8 June 1995)(Kenya) concerning a 25 year old ‘in a business 
career since the age of 18’ with ‘money of her own’. 
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Re X [2001] CanLII 26821 (IRB) (6 February 2001)(Lebanon), 4. 
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problematic first instance decisions on credibility (although some of these were later 
disapproved  of  on  judicial  review).  In  particular,  credibility  determinations  in  forced 
marriage claims revealed a range of largely unsupportable ‘plausibility’ assumptions116 about 
what marriage is and how families behave. 
 
 
Canadian tribunal members held that forced marriage claims were false on the basis that the 
following aspects of claims were inherently ‘implausible’: 
• a Christian father in Kenya arranged a forced marriage for his only daughter ‘with a 
 
considerably   older   man   with   multiple   wives’,  (likewise  a   Christian   father  in 
 
Nigeria);117 
• a Christian groom engaged in polygamy;118 
• family members opposed to a forced marriage did not approach state authorities in 
Zimbabwe;119 
• a mother concerned about the forced marriage of her daughter left her ‘near’ the 
father;120 
• a ‘determined and aggressive’ young woman in Guinea was nevertheless  forced to 
marry;121 
• an 18 year old Chinese girl who was a ‘family victim or exploitee’, still telephoned her 





See also J. Millbank ‘The “Ring of Truth”: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group 
Refugee Determinations’ (2009) 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 1. 
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Referenced in Gill v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2004] FC 902 (23 June 2004) at [9] 
which overturned the decision on judicial review. See also the Tribunal finding that a Christian family would not 
force a daughter into a polygamous marriage referred to in Otti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [2006] FC 1031 (28 August 2006) which overturned it on judicial review. 
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Referred to in Gill v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2004] FC 902 (23 June 2004) at [9] 
which overturned the decision on judicial review. 
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Re X [2006] CanLII 61633 (IRB) (27 March 2006)(Zimbabwe). 
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Begum  v  Canada  (Minister  of  Citizenship  and  Immigration)  [2000]  CanLII  16199  (FC)  (29  September 
2000)(Bangladesh). 
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Referenced  in  Houssainatou  v  Canada  (Minister  of  Citizenship  and  Immigration)  [2002]  FCT  2004  (26 
November 2002) at [3] which overturned the decision on judicial review. 
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Re X [2001] CanLII 26949 (IRB) (2 February 2001)(China). 
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• an Iranian woman maintained a ‘strained’ relationship with her parents after refusing 




A number of these findings reflect what Connie Oxford has called ‘assumptions of 
discontinuity’ in refugee determinations.124 Reflecting a male model of ‘public’ or state actor 
persecution, decision‐makers are unable to accept that the persecuted person may continue 
to have a relationship with their persecutor/s, most especially if they are family members. 
 
 
Many credibility or ‘plausibility’ findings were based squarely and solely on supposition and 
thus could not be falsified or verified by reference to any external indicator of likelihood — 
in which case applicants ought properly to be given the benefit of the doubt under basic 
principles of refugee law.125     However there were also occasional decisions on credibility 
that could, and should, have been assessed by reference to country of origin evidence. Of 
these,  the  most  troubling  held  on  the  basis  of  ‘documentary  evidence’  that  it  was 
implausible that a girl would be married under the legal age of marriage in Bangladesh (18 
years of age).126 This is a shocking finding, given that numerous international human rights 
agencies such as UNICEF and the UN Population Fund indentify Bangladesh as a major 
location of child marriage, with the majority of the female population married before the 




Referenced in Sadeghi‐Pari v Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) [2004] FCJ 316 (26 February 
2004) which overturned the decision on judicial review. 
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C. Oxford, ‘Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum’ (2005) 17 NWSA Journal 18, 31. 
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UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Handbook) (1992 edition) at [20]. See also 
Home Office (UK), Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility in Asylum and Human Rights Claims (c2007), 9; 
Canadian Refugee Protection Division, Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection (2004) at [1.3]; 
Australian Government, Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee Review Tribunal, Guidance on the Assessment 
of Credibility (2006, updated 2008) at [2.6]. 
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See eg UNICEF, ‘Child Protection Information Sheet: Child Marriage’ (2006) noting 65 per cent of women 
married before the age of 18; UNFPA, ‘State of the World’s Population: Child Marriage Fact Sheet’ (2005) 
stating that 45 per cent of young women now aged between 25 and 29 had been married before 15. See also 
World Vision, ‘Before She’s Ready: 15 Places Girls Marry by 15’ (2008) listing Bangladesh as the number one 
country with 52.5 per cent of the female population married before the age of 15. 
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There were thirty‐eight positive decisions in our data set. We counted as ‘positive’ decisions 
in which the outcome was what the refugee claimant sought at that stage. Yet judicial 
review decisions in all of the countries, and many tribunal level decisions in the UK, result in 
a redetermination of the claim, so positive decisions are not necessarily representative of 
substantively successful refugee outcomes.128  In short, counting 38 of our 120 decisions as 




Searching for commonalities among these claims is not easy, especially as many of the 12 
judicial review decisions do not contain much detail about the claim and thus it is difficult to 
ascertain a clear picture of the underlying facts, or of the basis of the original decision 
maker’s reasoning. The successful claimants come from 22 different countries in Europe, 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and include lesbians, gay men, heterosexual women and 
one of the two heterosexual men in the data set.  At the level of broad statistical sweep, this 
serves only to reinforce that each refugee determination is an individual inquiry. The positive 
decisions reflected typical generic elements of positive decisions in other types of refugee 
cases, such as strong country information in support of the claimant’s story and affirmative 
credibility findings.  As noted earlier, in gay men’s claims marriage itself was usually either 
framed or received as tangential to the major harm and many of the positive decisions were 
actually made on the basis that marriage or failure to marry would lead inevitably to the 
exposure of the applicant’s sexuality: thus the actual persecution was seen to be on the 








In addition, one of the positive judicial review decisions was later overturned on appeal: see n 103 above. 
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The  sole  successful  outcome  by  a  (presumed  by  the decision  maker)  heterosexual man  facing  forced 
marriage was a judicial review decision in the Canadian Federal Court, which held that it was not inherently 
implausible that a young Malian man would face forced marriage, and thus the findings of the IRB that only 
women were victims was unsound: Traore v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] FC 1256 
(28 October 2003). 
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The singularly most interesting factor in the positive cases is that forced marriage was in 
itself found to be a form of persecution in only 14 decisions. Even within these 14 cases the 
forced marriage claim was usually accompanied by ‘something more’, such as FGM, sexual 
and domestic violence, polygamy, levirate or sororat marriage.130 Of the entire pool of 120 
decisions we were able to identify only four cases in which forced marriage alone was held 
to be persecutory.131 This is absolutely at odds with the characterisation of consent in 
marriage as a core international human right, and is stunningly out of step with the United 
Kingdom’s domestic initiatives. 
 
 
The tendency to exoticise gender claims, now well documented,132 was notable in examining 
the women’s positive cases. For women success coalesced around two distinct themes, one 
being marriage as the site of other harms likely to occur as a result within or because of the 






The decisions that actually characterise forced marriage itself as persecutory are: MZXFJ v MIMA [2006] 
FMCA 1465 (10 October 2006)(Uganda); N95/10037 [1997] RRTA 623 (25 February 1997)(Bangladesh); 
N98/21046   [1999]   RRTA   1872   (12   October   1999)(Jordan);   N98/25465   [2001]   RRTA   27   (12   January 
2001)(Ghana);  V0618399  [2006]  RRTA  95  (22  June  2006)(Albania);  071426303  [2007]  RRTA  132  (29  June 
2007)(Saudi Arabia); Re X [2000] CanLII 21442 (IRB) (11 July 2000)(Nigeria); X v Canada (Immigration and 
Refugee Board) [2001] CanLII 26862 (IRB) (26 November 2001)(Central African Republic); X v Canada 
(Immigration and Refugee Board) [2001] CanLII 26862 (IRB) (26 November 2001)(Nigeria), Vidhani v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (TD) [1995] CanLII 3606 (FC) (8 June 1995)(Kenya); Traore v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] FC 1256 (28 October 2003); Eimani v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] FC 42 (17 January 2005)(Uganda); Houssainatou v Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] FCT 2004 (26 November 2002)(Guinea); and NS (Social Group) Afghanistan 
CG [2004] UKIAT 00328. 
 
131 The four decisions in which there was not clearly ‘something more’ in the claim such as FGM or polygamy in 
addition to the forced marriage are: Vidhani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (TD) [1995] 
CanLII 3606 (FC) (8 June 1995)(Kenya); Eimani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] FC 42 
(17 January 2005)(Uganda); Houssainatou v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] FCT 2004 
(26 November 2002)(Guinea); and NS (Social Group) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 in the UK.  In two of 
those four cases (Eimani v Canada and Houssainatou v Canada) the decisions are judicial review with little 
known about the facts. 
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See eg A. Macklin, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 
213; S. Razack, ‘Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution: Policing the Borders of Nation, Race and Gender’ 
(1995) 8 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 45; J. Bhabba ‘Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension 




See in particular C. Oxford’s finding in the US asylum context that FGM was always assumed to constitute 
persecution whereas domestic violence was not: n 124 above. 
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being that the kind of marriage was sufficiently non‐normative or ‘foreign’ to Western ideals 
of marriage that it was construed as distinctly harmful. 
 
 
The influence of exoticising factors in the kind of marriage under consideration should not 
be underestimated: 11 positive decisions concerning women (both heterosexual and lesbian) 
involved marriages with one or more of the following factors: polygamy, a Muslim groom 
(when the applicant was Christian), a groom who was a generation or more older than the 
woman, bride price or marriage debt, levirate marriage (marriage to the woman’s deceased 
husband’s brother) or sororat marriage (marriage to a deceased sister’s husband or fiancé). 
These practices are culturally remote from Western decision makers, and they correlated 
more closely with the positive than negative decisions. In contrast, domestic violence, a 
harm against women seen as ‘common’ in both refugee sending and receiving countries,134 
 




In nine of the positive heterosexual women’s claims, forced marriage was viewed as either a 
trigger for, or – less commonly – as part of a cumulative pattern of, persecution in which 
marriage became  a  site  for  other  harms,  in  particular  FGM.    In  this  reasoning,  forced 
marriage is only a harm because of its role in bringing about other more tangible forms of 
harm; implicitly forced marriage may have persecutory consequences rather than being in 
itself persecutory. One decision maker expressed this as follows: 
Although there are three separate forms of harm which the applicant faces upon 
return to Ghana (forcible marriage, forced conversion to Islam and being denied the 
right to practice her religion and circumcision), I have decided to treat the harm as a 
whole rather than individually because in my opinion they are inextricably linked to 
each other and the second two harms are consequent upon the forced marriage.135 
 
In two of the three positive decisions coming out of the United Kingdom, the claims involved 
an array of exoticising factors as well as subsequent or consequential harms. In TB, a young 
Iranian woman’s politically powerful father required her to become a second wife to a 60 







N98/25465 [2001] RRTA 27 (12 January 2001)(Ghana), 17.   See also N95/10037 [1997] RRTA 623 (25 
February 1997)(Bangladesh) and N95/06944 [1996] RRTA 3480 (4 December 1996)(Bangladesh). 
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were to return to Iran the applicant would be at risk of physical harm or death at her father’s 
hands, and if she proceeded with the proposed marriage (under duress or by consent) she 
would be seriously harmed by the husband in retribution for her flight. Thus the decision 
addressed itself to harms which would arise after the claimant was forced to marry. In RG, 
the marriage in question was a levirate ‘marriage by abduction’ of a child.136 
 
 
A few of the positive cases did provide examples of nuanced reasoning, analysing forced 
marriage  itself  as  persecution  without  an  undue  focus  on  consequential  or  exoticising 
factors.   These decisions suggest the possibility of breaking down the ‘us’ marriage and 
‘them’ marriage distinction, and come closest to analysing marriage as it is seen in human 
rights settings. An early judicial review decision of the Canadian Federal Court succinctly 
demonstrates an appropriate approach.  With reference to both international human rights 
standards and to the Canadian guidelines on gender related persecution, the court held that 
the originating tribunal erred because it failed to address the proper question by only asking 
whether the  female claimant  would  face  spousal  abuse  after  the  threatened marriage. 
Justice McKeown concluded, 
women who are forced into marriages against their will have had a basic human 
right violated. There are United Nations conventions to which Canada is a party 
which state that the right to enter freely into marriage is a basic human right.  …it is 
not necessary for the Board [IRB] to look at whether the sanctions are so severe 
that they severely interfere with bodily integrity or human dignity.137 
 
A 2007 decision from the Australian Tribunal similarly identified an act of forced marriage 
itself as a form of persecutory harm.  While this case involved threats of death and a record 
of serious physical harm, the Tribunal nonetheless concluded: 
that the forcible marriage of the applicant without her consent constitutes serious 
harm … The Tribunal notes and accepts the country information set out above 
which indicates that while the authorities have taken some steps to protect women 
in Saudi Arabia from forced marriage the practice is still widespread and that the 





RG (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 339. 
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Vidhani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(TD) [1995] CanLII 3606 (FC)(8 June 1995) (Kenya), 
4. The Court returned the case to the Tribunal to be re‐decided by a differently constituted panel. 
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RRT Reference 071426303 [2007] RRTA 132 (29 June 2007) (Saudi Arabia), 16. 
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In the one UK decision where forced marriage itself was seen as a harm, NS, the tribunal 
demonstrated a remarkable ability to focus on forced marriage as the principal harm given a 
factual  context  which  included  ethnic  and  political  persecution  and  a  serious  sexual 
assault.139  The Tribunal went so far as to note that the Afghan government had failed to 
criminalise forced marriage140 and considered both that the applicant ought not be forced 
into the specific marriage with which she had been threatened and that she ought not be 
generally compelled to marry in order to gain the protection of a man (and thus a safer life in 
Kabul).  The Tribunal further considered that the applicant’s two young daughters would also 
be at risk of forced marriage.141  It is noteworthy that one of the sitting members of the 
Tribunal in NS was Vice President Catriona Jarvis, who was one of the authors of the original 




While these ‘best practice’ decisions, or perhaps more accurately, best‐practice‐so‐far 
decisions, do rely on human right standards, they do not go so far as to engage with ideas of 
individual autonomy and choice. In our view, human rights standards are an important step, 
but still represent a very thin vision of autonomy and self‐determination.  In this regard, it is 
instructive to contrast even the most successful forced marriage refugee claims with the 
work of the Forced Marriage Unit in the UK. It is to this contrast that we now turn. 
 
 
THE FORCED MARRIAGE UNIT 
 
Britain’s Forced Marriage Unit is a stunning example of a Western government embracing an 
ideologically charged defence of freedom to marry as a human right.  In its own words, the 
unit is ‘…the only  government unit in the world dedicated to investigating and  helping 
people escape forced marriages.’142 The FMU was established in 2005 and is a joint initiative 
of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office. The FMU is located in 
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NS (Social Group) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328. 
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NS (Social Group) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 at [61]. 
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NS (Social Group) Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 at [96]. 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Forced Marriage Unit’ at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco‐in‐ 
action/casestudies/forced‐marriage (last visited 27 May 2009). This includes bringing wardship applications on 
behalf of minors, see eg SB and RB [2008] EWHC 938 (Fam). 
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the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and grew out of the earlier ‘community liaison’ 
unit operative in that department since 2000.143  The Unit has a staff of seven based in 
London  and  it  works  with  overseas  consular  staff  as  required.  A  statutory  guidance 
document accompanying the new legislation states that in the first nine months of 2008, 
1,300 ‘instances of suspected forced marriage’ were reported to the FMU.144 In terms of on‐ 
 




Uniquely, the Forced Marriage Unit has developed a capacity to act overseas to assist Britons 
and dual citizens facing forced marriage. The FMU coordinates consular staff abroad, 
intervening directly when the unit or consular staff are notified that someone is at risk of 
forced marriage, or has been forced to marry, overseas.  By 2008 the unit had reportedly 
assisted with 180 such cases overseas.146 On the ‘support British nationals abroad’ page of 
the FCO website, the ‘Forced Marriage’ banner appears between ‘The FCO in an emergency’ 
(other examples include hurricanes, terrorism, and plane crashes) and ‘Child Abduction.’ The 
message is clear: we take this seriously. In the case study of ‘Farah’, featured on the FCO 
website in January 2009, consular staff in Islamabad intervened when Farah’s boyfriend in 
the United Kingdom alerted the Forced Marriage Unit that something seemed wrong during 
Farah’s trip to Pakistan to visit her dying grandfather. As recounted in the case study: 
 
Later that same day, Farah contacted us from a friend’s house. …She pleaded with 
us to rescue her from the nightmare in which she had found herself. 
 
Our rescue operation swung into action and within 48 hours our staff had got her 
out and brought her back to Islamabad. She had visible physical injuries where her 











This unit also commissioned sociological research, see eg Y. Samad and J. Eade, ‘Community Perceptions of 
Forced Marriage’ FCO, Community Liaison Unit (2001). 
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Foreign   and   Commonwealth   Office,   ‘Forced   Marriage   Unit’   at   http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco‐in‐ 





Back in the UK the FMU arranged for her boyfriend to send her the money for a 
flight home. The next day they were reunited at the airport and they are now 
happily married.147 
 
The same case study offers the reassurance to Britons at risk overseas that the FMU deals 
with cases like this every week.  In December 2008, the UK press reported that the FMU’s 
rescue activities extended to a British resident non‐national as well.148 
 
 
A major aim of the unit is ‘community education’ which is broadly targeted,  including 
brochures for people at risk of forced marriage (discussed below), ‘awareness raising 
materials’ for schools including a video (Tying the Knot’ 2002), posters, brochures and cards 
directed at students and teachers (2008)149, a national publicity campaign in 2006 (‘You have 
the right to choose’), a half hour DVD on the FMU and its cases (‘The Forced Marriage Unit’ 
also released on YouTube, 2008)150 and close co‐operation in the production of a BBC 
documentary which  followed  their  rescue  activities  in  Pakistan  (‘This  World:  Forced  to 
Marry’ December 2008). The FMU also hosts web links and regional contact information for 
a  range  of  women’s  refuges  and  domestic  violence  services,  and  produces  substantial 




The FMU message appears feminist informed and relatively nuanced.   For example the 
statutory guidance statement lists the ‘key motives’ behind forced marriage, the first of 
which is ‘…controlling unwanted sexuality (including perceived promiscuity, or being lesbian, 
gay, bisexual or transgender) – particularly the sexuality of women’.151 The LGBT brochure 








O. Bowcott and J. Percival, ‘Bangladeshi “forced marriage” GP due back in Britain tomorrow’ The Guardian 
15 December 2008. See also In the Matter of a Child [2008] EWCH 1436 (Fam). 
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See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AoGwwlFw20s (last visited 14 May 2009). 
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Sukhvinder was told that a relative was ill and was tricked into going to India.  Once  
 
there, his family took his mobile phone, passport and money.  The male members of 
his family told him that they knew about his sexuality, and that he would have to 
remain in India and marry a girl already chosen for him from the village.  When he 
refused, they beat him. 
 
Although I am gay, I wasn’t really ‘out’ for a long time.  I felt ashamed that as a man 
I was being forced into a marriage, and that my family was being violent with me.  It 
was horrible for me and the girl I was forced to marry. 
 
Sukhvinder managed to contact the British Consulate in India, who helped him 
return to the UK.  Once home, the FMU put Sukhvinder in touch with organisations 
that have worked with him around issues of sexuality, depression and stress.152 
 
 
In this FMU brochure, as in other FMU texts, the harm of forced marriage is directly linked to 
non‐conforming sexuality; a perspective rarely seen in the refugee cases. The FMU 
emphatically and repeatedly articulates forced marriage as a practice which disciplines non‐ 
conforming sexuality and frequently notes that it is often used against adolescents and 
young adults whose families have become aware that they are involved in relationships of 
which the families disapprove. Policy initiatives include roles for schools and teachers, health 
care professionals, social workers, police, community organisations and individuals in being 
alert to and responding to situations of forced marriage. These policy initiatives articulate a 




The ideological context of the anti‐forced marriage message comes through most clearly in 
the ‘Forced Marriage Survivor’s Handbook’.153 The handbook aims to assist those who have 
decided to leave a forced marriage; it sets out basic advice about finding housing or refuge, 
managing finances, finding a job, repaying debts and returning to education. Like other FMU 
documents, it highlights survivor testimonials. Most interestingly, the handbook features 
many blank lined pages and encourages the reader to write her or his own plans and dreams 
on the facing pages of the bureaucratic advice.  The first is prefaced with, ‘Make some notes 
or write a description of your new life as you’d like it to be.  You’ll be able to look back on 
this  –  maybe  adding  to  it  from  time  to  time  –  and  it  will  help  you  stay  focused  and 
 
152 
n 50 above, 4 (italics in the original). 
 
153 
FMU, ’Forced Marriage Survivor’s Handbook’ (c 2007) at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/2855621/survivors‐handbook (last visited 26 May 2009). 
39 
motivated.’154   The blank pages are framed with inspirational quotations: ‘Turn your face to  
 
 
the sun and the shadows fall behind you’; ‘You must be the change you wish to see’. The 
cover page of the volume is itself untitled, but quotes Lao‐tzu, ‘A journey of a thousand miles 
begins with a single step’.   These currently popular quotations are employed here as the 
beckoning of empowered liberal individualism. The call to the diary mode of individual 
actualisation is the consciousness‐raising precursor to the group orientation which is 
feminism.  The marriage which is protected, valued, reified by Western law is the marriage 
of triumphant self‐actualising individuals: precisely those who are the subjects and objects of 
human rights law.155  The way forward for those who are trapped in forced marriages is to 
become those on whom marriage cannot be forced. The introduction to the handbook reads: 
Everyone has the right to choose who they marry and when they get married.  You 
are not wrong for having made the brave decision to leave a forced marriage.  This 
book will give you useful and practical information to help you take control of your 
life and focus on the future.156 
 
 
The chasm between the image of forced marriage that appears in refugee law and the image 
of forced marriage portrayed by the Forced Marriage Unit is deep.   Indeed refugee cases 
often come close to portraying forced marriage as a potentially unfortunate but inevitable 
consequence of pervasive cultural practices.    Considering the expectation that all 
Bangladeshi men will marry and that the ‘needs of the family and the community’ outweigh 
those of the individual, one Australian case in 1998 stated, 
While not advocating … unwilling marriage …it is fair to note that the Applicant [a 
gay man] is a member of a whole culture and has a continued allegiance to his 




Here the decision maker recasts forced marriage as ‘unwilling’ and presents it as a situation 
which is not ideal, but not so damaging as to merit the kind of ‘rescue’ that being allowed to 







See eg Razack’s argument, in the context of forced marriage in Norway that it rationalises ‘the colonial 
project as one of modern destiny’, n 20 above, 149. 
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It would be enlightening to directly compare refugee claims made in the United Kingdom 
with the case load of the FMU.  This is simply not possible because there are only a handful 
of available UK cases, and because those cases devote so little analysis to the question of 
forced marriage.  As we have argued above, the positive refugee decisions are almost never 
about forced marriage alone.   The clear analysis of forced marriage as persecution in the 
lone case of NS has not been picked up by later UK decision‐makers, nor has the frame of 
reference offered by the FMU apparently had any influence. While the legal content and 
political context of domestic forced marriage legislation and refugee law obviously differ, we 
would have expected to see at least some glimmer of shared understanding of the issues 
emerge in the UK in recent years. 
 
 
There is  no  equivalent  to  the  FMU  in  either Canada  or Australia,  where, despite large 
migrant  communities  (including  from  South  Asia)  a  domestic political  engagement with 
forced marriage has not yet emerged.158   Both Australian and Canadian governments have 
expressed concern about their citizens being forced into marriages while out of the country, 
but no domestic initiatives have materialised.159 This increases the depth of the paradox that 
it is UK refugee jurisprudence which is the most out of step both with international human 
rights standards and the more nuanced (if sometimes paternalistic) FMU understanding of 
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On the basis of our analysis of available refugee case law, we suggest that if many, perhaps 
most, of those individuals rescued abroad by the FMU were instead to make asylum claims 
of the United Kingdom, Australia or Canada on the basis of forced marriage, they would be 
refused. A striking illustration is the case of Humayra Abedin, a Bangladeshi national who 
was rescued from a forced marriage in Bangladesh through the combined efforts of the FMU 
and a Bangladeshi women’s organisation (Ain O Salish Kendra). Although neither a British 
nor dual national, Humayra had been living in Britain for six years, first as a student and then 
as a trainee National Health Service doctor when her family tricked her into returning to 
Bangladesh  in  August  2008  in  order  to  coerce  her  into  a  marriage she  had  previously 
rejected. The High Court of England and Wales issued a protection order on behalf of 
Humayra and she was ultimately brought before a court in Bangladesh which then placed 
her in the protection of police and British consular officers who assisted her to return to 
England two days later (where further protection orders were then issued to prevent her 
family from approaching her or attempting to remove her from the jurisdiction).160  Yet if 
 
Humayra had made a refugee claim it is extremely unlikely that she would have succeeded. 
Firstly, Humayra would have struggled within the UK jurisprudence both to articulate a 
particular social group and to argue that forced marriage itself constituted persecution. 
While she did suffer months of forced imprisonment, ‘manhandling’ and involuntary 
medication prior to the marriage, her account of the actual marriage ceremony was that she 
entered into it under ‘emotional duress’ rather than as a response to specific threats of 
violence. Moreover Humayra was not young, rural, poorly educated or financially dependent 
upon her parents. At the time of the marriage she was 32 years old, urban, educated (indeed 
a doctor with a Masters level education), had travelled and lived independently and was 
economically self‐supporting; all factors that in numerous cases we examined were held to 
vitiate a claim to forced marriage or the inability to access state protection. In addition, like 
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parents who had put her through this ordeal, ‘they are still my parents. I do not have any 
bad feelings against them, any grudges’.161 
 
 
This discordance underlines that refugee law is only ever partially about human rights 
protection, that it recognises some types of human rights violations more keenly and more 
regularly than others, and that it embeds a persistent cultural relativism.   In refugee law, 
forced  marriage  appears  to  be  characterised  largely  as  an  understandable  offshoot  of 
‘culture’, the defining characteristic of the ‘other’.  This was true in cases in all three of the 
 
countries we examined, but was most in stark in the UK.  Furthermore, the contrast seen 
here demonstrates that while the British government has moved away from the blunt 
instrument  of  immigration  restrictions  as  a  response  to  forced  marriage,  the  double 
standard of ‘marriage for us’ and ‘marriage for them’ continues to flourish in British asylum 
law.  While refugee law is sometimes viewed as part of the system of human rights law, in 
this light it is shown to be an effective immigration law screen above all, used as a border 
enforcing mechanism against individuals who, if they had legal immigration status in Britain, 
would be entitled to state sponsored rescue and support. 
 
 
The image of the strong, benevolent state rescuing victims of forced marriage through the 
overseas reach of the FMU is the antithesis of refugee law, where Western states defend 
themselves through a variety of means aimed at limiting flows of asylum seekers to their 
borders.  Refugee law  seeks to reinforce borders; the FMU acts in  spite  of  them.    This 
contrast is hard to square.  But it seems that those in need of ‘rescue’ have already become 
enough ‘us’ to merit higher human rights consideration than their cultural, or even national, 
counterparts.  It may simply be that proximity does generate affiliation, even as immigration 
policy‐makers fret that assimilation is elusive.  It may also be that many of the states where 
FMU missions are accomplished are part of the former British ‘empire’, and that here the 
reach of the benevolent British state is enmeshed in Western (post)colonial practice. It is this 
that complicates any reaction to the FMU: in its work the victims of forced marriage are 
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hobbled  by  culture  and  exhorted  to  liberal  individualism,  but  they  are  nonetheless 
welcomed among us, urged to become more us, encouraged to replace the support of the 
no‐longer‐welfare state for that of traditional family. This tentative analysis also helps us see 
why refugee law struggles so with forced marriage: the ‘marriage’ part of the equation is not 
quite ‘other’ enough to fit the refugee framework. 
